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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

J 0 S E PH P. McCARREN d/b/a
McCARREN PLUMBING AND
HEATING CO.,
Plaintiff and Respondent~

Case No.
9857

vs.

CHARLES S. MERRILL,
Defendant and A ppcllant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Charles S. Merrill, defendant below, has appealed
from a judgment awarding to plaintiff $1510.90 for
services and materials furnished by the plaintiff at
defendant's request on certain residential rental property owned by defendant in Salt Lake County. Plaintiff and respondent cross appeals for attorney's fees
under the contract.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judge Stewart M. Hanson awarded judgment to
the plaintiff in the sum of $1510.90, dismissed defendant's counterclaim, and denied plaintiff any attorney
fees.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent asks the court to affirm the judgment of Judge Hanson on the merits of the case and
to reverse his decision insofar as he refused the plaintiff attorney's fees under the agreement.

CROSS APPEAL
Plaintiff hereby cross appeals to the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah from that part of the decree
of the court in the above entitled cause dated December
14, 1962 denying plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fef
in accordance with the prayer of plaintiff's complaint.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts of the appellant in his brief
is, to a large extent, the argument made by respondent
and defendant below rather than a statement of the
facts as found by the District Judge. It is necessary,
therefore, to restate the facts in accordance with the
lower court's ruling and the evidence.
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Plaintiff Joseph P. McCarren is a licensed plumber
in Salt Lake County, Utah, and was duly authorized
under such licenses to perform plumbing services during
the month of October, 1960 to and including the date
of the trial (Findings of Fact No. 1, R. 20, 46, 47).
Plaintiff has had 20 years experience as a plumber,
but prior to the time in question had never dealt with
the defendant (R. 47). Immediately prior to the time
of the execution of the written agreement between the
parties, in evidence as plaintiff's Exhibit 1, plaintiff
called upon the defendant in response to a telephone
call from J. Price Company at the defendant's residence at 1975 Millcreek Way and discussed with the
defendant work which defendant required (R. 48).
Plaintiff testified that he explained to the defendant that on all his jobs he billed every 30 days and
expected them to pay by the lOth of the month so that
plaintiff could meet his obligations (R. 48). The defendant explained that he wanted the plumbing wol'k
done "right away". Plaintiff therefore commenced
work immediately (R. 60). Plaintiff testified that it
was not his custom to fill in the blank on the f onn
contract he used under the heading "Payments to be
Made as Follows", but that he customarily billed his
customers monthly, and that he was not in the finance
business and could not afford to finance construction
(R. 60-61). Most of the longhand insertions on Exhibit 1 appear in plaintiff's handwriting, but Mr. 1\tler·rill examined the contract in detail and the language
with respect to the water sprinkler and related infor-
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mation on the right hand side of the page is in defendant's handwriting (R. 49). The court expressly found
that ''defendant and plaintiff agreed that the defendant
would pay to the plaintiff for materials furnished and
services rendered, pursuant to said contract, on or before the lOth [of the] month after the month in which
the same were furnished, and the plaintiff would render
a statement to the defendant at the end of such calendar
month during the period of time such materials and
services were furnished and performed." Thus the
court expressly adopted plaintiff's version of the contract and rejected the defendant's testimony to the
effect that there was no such conversation.
It was plaintiff's practice to require his employees
to write up a job ticket at the end of each day describing
the material installed and the time spent on the job.
Where material is in addition to the work described
in the contract, the word "extra" is placed on the ticket.
These tickets are retained by the plaintiff in the normal
course of the business as a normal part of his usual
and ordinary business records. . The information reflected on the tickets is tabulated and transmitted onto
a ledger sheet. Plaintiff's job tickets on the defendant's
building project were marked collectively as Exhibit
2. They reflect in detail the materials used and the work
performed each day. They support the conclusion,
taking into account plaintiff's normal practice and in
the light of his twenty years' experience as a plumber,
that the fair and reasonable value of the labor performed and materials furnished on the premises at 1975
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1\iillcreek Way between October 5, 1960 and the middle
of November, 1960, was in the sum of $2110.90. The
court found that $288.14 of such amount was additional to the items contemplated by the parties as reflected in the written agreement, said items being designated as "extra" by plaintiff (Finding No. 3, R. 21).
The court expressly found that on or about November I, 1960, plaintiff rendered an invoice to the
defendant in the sum of $1800. (Finding No. 4, R. 21).
This finding was in accordance with plaintiff's testimony. Plaintiff testified that Mr. Merrill visited the
premises practically every day; that he did not make
any objections concerning the status or quality of the
work. It is not plaintiff's practice to keep copies of
invoices because the information reflected by the invoice
is simply taken from his ledger (R. 53). Plaintiff testified that on or about the lOth of November he called
Mr. Merrill and inquired if he could draw some money
on the job. Mr. J\!Ierrill responded that he could not
pay him, that he was having trouble with the federal
government but that he would send a check shortly.
Plaintiff continued to work on the job until N ove1nher
16 (R. 53, Exhibit 2). Approximately December 20
or 21, plaintiff discussed the question of payment at
the Deseret Mortuary, and defendant promised plaintiff a check for $1,000 "in the next day or so". "I told
him I needed the money to pay my bills, and, well,
things were tough in general; and he said he would have
me a $1,000 before Christmas" (R. 54). ·Plaintiff told
the defendant at that time that he would put his men
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back on the job as soon as he had the money. Finally,
on January 12, plaintiff called upon Mrs. Merrill and
she gave him a check for $500. (Exhibit 4). Plaintiff
called the defendant and told him that if he would pay
him an additional $500 he would go back to work (R.
55, 56) . The court expressly found that between No·
vember 1, when the plaintiff's invoice was rendered,
and January 12, plaintiff repeatedly demanded pay·
ment and the defendant consistently and repeatedly
refused to pay any part of the amount due. The court
expressly found "that the payment of the $500 to
plaintiff . . . was not on the condition that [plaintiff]
immediately return to work . . . but said amount was
paid with the understanding that the defendant would
pay or cause to be paid to plaintiff an additional $500
before plaintiff would return to work" (Finding No.
5, R. 21).

The value of the work done was $2010.90. After
the $500 credit, there was due and owing plaintiff
$1510.90 for services rendered and materials furnished
to that time (see Exhibits 2, 3; Finding No. 4) . The
court found that when the defendant failed to pay
plaintiff's invoice of November 1, 1960, or at least
when he failed and refused to pay the sum of $1,000
.which plaintiff had agreed to accept as a condition to
returning to work, "such failure constituted a breach
of the agreement between the parties and justified
plaintiff in refusing to complete said work" (Finding
No. 8, R. 23}.
8
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At approximately the time the plaintiff left the
job, the "rough plumbing" was inspected by the inspector for Salt Lake County and the work was approved
(R. 101}.
At the trial, the defendant attempted to establish
that the plaintiff stopped working because the sewer
line immediately outside the house 'Yas higher than the
location where the connection could be made from th~
pipes coming from one of the bathrooms. Plaintiff testified, however, and defendant did not deny that the
sewer line was being dug by defendant's men and that
they left the job before plaintiff had. Moreover, the
practice in the industry is that a plumber extends the
sewer pipeline only five feet from the building and the
expense of connection from that point to the sewer
is borne by the owner (R. 166). Of interest on this
point is the fact that defendant wanted to charge plaintiff app~oximately $460.00 for digging a trench to the
point where the sewer could be connected ( R. 94) ;
whereas the normal charge was $2.50 per foot, defendant admitting that he had paid that amount only
two years previously on the sa1ne house. It is undisputed that defendant did not tell the plaintiff that
the footings in which plaintiff was installing the plumbing were lower elevation than the sewer connections
at the time the contract was signed.
Defendant testified that he had been required to
pay at least $2531.00 to complete the plumbing job.
(This testimony is smnewhat difficult to follow but
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he was claiming at least the following amounts: $1616.07
to Christensen (R. 93, 99; Exhibit 15); $500.00 cash
to Christensen, (R. 93, 53, 102, 105) ; $255.00 to England Plumbing, (R. 93) ; and $460.00 for the trench to
Lake Hills Memorial (R. 94). His testimony, however,
was consistently and substantially impeached. The court
found that the defendant failed to establish that the
failure of the plaintiff to complete the plumbing work
contemplated by the agreement received as Exhibit I
was the proximate result of any act or neglect of the
plaintiff, and that the defendant failed to establish
that the fair cost of completing the work described in
the agreement would have exceeded the contract price.
The court further found that the defendant had not
fairly attempted to mitigate damages (Finding No.6;
R. 220). The evidence on these points will be discussed
in more detail under Point II of this brief.
Although finding in accordance with plaintiff's
testimony that plaintiff's failure to complete the contract resulted fro1n defendant's breach, the court found
that plaintiff- was not entitled to recover any attorney's
fees (Finding No. 7, R. 22). Exhibit 1 provides that
"Purchaser agrees to pay any expense incurred by the
Seller after Purchaser's breach of this contract, including cost of repossession and reasonable attorney's fees.
Interest at B1o to be charged upon delinquent payments." (Exhibit 1, para. 6.)
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POINT I.
THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT
THE PARTIES AGREED THAT PLAINTIFF
WAS TO BE PAID MONTHLY AS THE
WORK PROGRESSED~
The written contract between the parties was left
blank under the heading: "Payments to be Made as
Follows:". The court therefor appropriately received
evidence as to the .parties' intentions on this term of
the agreement. This court held in Burt v. Stringfellow
et ux (1914) 45 Ut. 207, 143 P. 234; see also Udy
v. Jensen (1924) 65 Ut. 95, 222 P. 597, that the function of the trial court was to determine the intentions
of the parties. Since the written agreement did not
have any provisions on this particular item, the intention
of the parties must be determined by consideration of
the circumstances of the parties and their testimony
as to what occurred at the- time the contract was signed
(32 C.J.S. 1027, Evidence Section 1013). Respondents
cite Maw v. Noble (1960) 10 Ut. (2d) 440, 354 P. (2d)
121, for the proposition that the contract should be
construed against the plaintiff since he was its author.
But the court held in that case that "The primary and
fundamental. rule is that the- contract must be looked
at realistically in the light of the circumstances under
which it w~s entered into, and if the intent of 'the parties
can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, if must
be given effect." cf. Craine v. Hagenbarth (1910) 37
Ut. 69, 106 P. 945.
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POINT II.
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT
SHOULD BE SUSTAINED SINCE THEY
ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
This court has stated many times that Findings of
Fact by the trial judge will not be disturbed so long
as they are supported by substantial evidence. Lowe v.
Rosenlof (1961) 12 Ut. (2d) 190, 364 P{2d) 418;
Child v. Child {1958) 8 Ut. (2d) 261, 332 P (2d) 981.
(a) Appellant does not seriously challenge Judge
Hanson~s Findings of Fact. It is significant that the
appellant here does not suggest that Judge Hanson's
Findings are not supported by the evidence. The appellant makes a broad argument on the facts de· novo as
though the factual conflicts had not been resolved at
the trial level. Sustaining of the Findings by respondent
therefore, is in a sense, superfluous.
It should be pointed out, however, that on the
critical issue as to whether the -parties agreed orally
that defendant would pay plaintiff monthly, plaintiff's
testimony was direct and clear. He stated unequivocably
that he explained to defendant that he billed on his
jobs every 30 days and expected customers to pay by
the lOth of the month so that he could meet his olvn
obligations (R. 38, 60-61). 'Vhile ~Ir. Merrill's testimony was to the contrary, his statements were substantially and consistently iinpeached.
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Plaintiff and the other witness called in his behalf,
William J. Clawson, testified directly and positively
as to the actual items of material and number of hours
per day that he spent on the defendant's premises. The
reasonable value of the work was in accordance with
plaintiff's practice, buttressed by his 20 years as a
licensed plumber. The witness called by the defendant.
Mr. Christensen, admitted that the plaintiff's work
was approved by the County Inspector and that the
rough plumbing was usually approximately 65Cjo of the
total cost of a job. The contract price was $2981.00.
Sixty-five per cent of that amount would have been
$1937.65. The total amount of the work performed
and materials furnished by the plaintiff was valued
by him at $2110.90. Of this sum, $288.14 were extras.
Thus the reasonable value placed by the plaintiff on
the rough plumbing required by the contract was
$1802.72, approximately $130.00 less than Mr. Christensen testified would have been a normal price for
such services and materials.
Taken as a whole, the record sustains the findings
of the trial court without r~gard to the fact that the
defendant w~s thoroughly impeached.
(b) The. positions of the defendant were substantially conflicting and his personal testimony was i11~
peached. The positions and testimony of Mr. Merrill

were in such conflict with each other that any findings
based on them would have been subject to the most
serious criticism. While not exhaustive, the following
list of inconsistencies illustrate his total want of candor:
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( 1) Merrill testified on direct examination

that the only conversations he had with plaintiff
about money was when plaintiff called at the mortuary on or about January 12. He at first denied
that he had ever received a statement from lHr.
McCarren on November 1 ( R. 135) . On crossexamination, his counsel admitted for him that
on his deposition he testified that he had received
McCarren's statement of November 1 (R. 136,
137).

( 2) Merrill claimed he had paid Mr. Christensen
$1616.07 for materials (R. 93; see also Exhibit
15) ; whereas, Mr. Christensen stated that the defendant furnished all of the materials (R. 99). The
only amount that defendant paid Mr. Christensen
was $500 (R. 153), and that check bounced (R.
118; see also Exhibit 7). After Christensen's testimony, the defendant grudgingly admitted that
he hadn't paid Mr. Christensen anything for materials (R. 102, 105).
( 3) Merrill testified that he wrote plaintiff a
letter telling him in substance and effect to do the
work or he would hire somebody else (R. 156).
Such a letter would have to have been written prior
to the middle of January because that is when the
defendant hired l\Ir. Christensen to cmnplete the
job. Yet defendant admitted that he had never
complained to the defendant about the job in any
way prior to March 7, after plaintiff had demanded
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payment and referred the claims to counsel for
collection ( R. 137-138 ; Exhibit 15) .
(4) Defendant denied that he knew that the
County Inspector approved the basic plumbing
and that he had discussed the matter with Christensen (R. 150) .
( 5) Merrill is claiming that he lost tenants
from substantially the middle of December and
that he was extremely anxious to have the job
cmnpleted; yet he admits that he never complained
.to the plaintiff in any manner about plaintiff's
performance on the job until after he had received a demand letter from plaintiff's counsel
(R. 137-138; Exhibits 14 and 15).
( 6) Merrill testified that he had built three or
four million dollars worth of buildings (R. 132133), yet he didn't know that the practice in the

construction industry was that the elevation of
sewers was determined by the general contractor
rather than the plumber (R. 134; cf. R. 165).
(7) Merrill was forced, on cross examination,

to admit that most ·af the items which he claimed
he had paid for consisted of duplications of the
items which were on the premises prior to the time
when plaintiff quit the job. The duplication of items
claimed by the defendant on his ,counterclaim were
proved from his own exhibits (R. 140-147).
(8) After extensive cross examination where
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defendant was required to identify numerous items
in detail that he wanted credit for on his counterclaim in addition to the items that were listed in
the contract between the parties (Exhibit 1 ; R.
139-147), defendant then denied that any items
went into the premises in addition to those described
in the original agreement ( R. 158) .
( 9) Defendant repeatedly made inconsistent

statements as to whether demand was made for
payment (R. 161-162).
( 10) Merrill, whose occupation was a mortician (R. 132) testified that plaintiff's work was

improper and that charges were made by the
plumbers to correct some of it (R. 92), but Merrill's expert witness, Christensen, who had been in
the plumbing business for many years, testified
as to the various items in dispute: "It wasn't the
fault of the plumber" (R. 104-105), explaining
that errors made by other subcontractors had required some changes in the plumbing.
( 11 ) Merrill admitted that he did not tell

plaintiff when the contract was signed that the
elevation of the line running from one of the bathrooms was lower than the existing line to the sewer
(R. 147) ; yet he now wants to charge plaintiff
$460.00 (R. 94) for the entire cost of running the
line from five feet outside the house, which, according to industry practice, would terminate the
plumber's reSJ>Onsibility (R. 166) to the point of
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connecting the sewer, which Merrill testified to
variously was "80 feet" (R. 94), "60 to 70 feet" (R.
122). The proposed charge was calculated at $12
per hour credited by Lake Hills Memorial (R. 151,
152). His original cost for laying the sewer was
only 50c p.er foot (R. 157) and the normal industry charge at the present time does not exceed
$2.50 per foot.
In sum, and taken as a whole, defendant's contentions are simply not believable. The trial judge's
rejection of them was not only warranted; it was required by the record.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN--FAILING TO
AWARD PLAINTIF~., AN ATTORNEY'S
FEE.
The law is well settled that where a contractor
completes a part of the work agreed upon and leaves
the premises because of non-payment by the owner,
the contractor is entitled to payment on ·a, ·quantu1n
meruit basis for the work he did perform, even though
he is not entitled to all of the benefits of the contract.
Lowe v. Rosenlof (1916) 12 Ut.) 2d) 190, 364 P (2d)
418; Ryan v. Curlew Irrigation and Rese.rvoir- Co.
(1909) 36 Ut. 382, .104· P. 318; Eckes v. Luce (
)
70 Okl. 67,.173 P. 219, 17-A· C.J.S. 828, Contracts,
Section 511. When the defendant failed to pay the
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amount of the November I billing, plaintiff had an
immediate cause of action for the work performed at
that time. The defendant was in default of the contract.
Respondent does not contend that he should recover
profits for the work which he did not perform. But,
on the other hand, defendant should not be entitled to
benefit from his own breach. It is submitted that the
contract itself provides that in the event of breach, the
defaulting party should pay collection costs, including
attorney's fees, and that the court should have awarded
attorney's fees in ratio to the damages sustained by the
plaintiff at that time. Plaintiff should not be required to
complete the job simply to enable himself to recover attorney's fees. Defendant has already breached. The
argument has particular cogency where the defendant
has repeatedly promised plaintiff money and then
failed to perform.
It is suggested that this court can fix attorney's
fees in accordance with the experience of the court
or the schedule of the Bar Association without additional evidence, and that upon remand, the lower court
could be instructed to amend the judgment fixing fees
without a further hearing.
CONCLUSION
The Findings of Fact of the trial judge are supported by the evidence, and the decision rendered on
the merits of the case was in accordance with applicable
legal principles. Since the defendant violated the con·
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tract and required plaintiff to sue to obtain recovery
under its provisions, the defendant should be required
to pay reasonable costs of collection, including counsel
fees. With the modifications suggested by the respondent's cross appeal, the judgment of the trial court
should be affirmed.

RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED

THIS

22nd day of November, I 963.

GEORGE M. McMILLAN
1020 Kearns Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondevt
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